How a hacker goes from zero to hero and causes a cyber crisis

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In the heat of the crisis







Your expectations mirror the challenges you encounter!

- Do you have a checklist for better preparedness?
- What is the ultimate solution to prevent all cyberattacks?
- How to anticipate a crisis effectively?
- Identifying the most likely crisis scenarios for your organization.
- Strategies for preventing a cyber crisis.
- The criteria for classifying an incident as a risk.
- Efficient methods to detect all potential hacker entry points.
- Calculating risk efficiently for specific threats or crises.
- Addressing concerns and nervousness within top management.
- Key elements to include in cyber crisis test scenarios.

- Sensitizing customers to the importance of crisis preparedness.
- Predictions for the cybersecurity industry in the next two years.
- Mitigating the lack of anticipation.
- Promoting responsibility among key stakeholders before a crisis and avoiding decision overlaps during a crisis.
- Etc.



How a hacker goes from zero to hero and causes a cyber crisis

Let's not wait for a crisis but learn to be the hero ourselves and avoid one.

In this breakout session, we'll delve into the thrilling realm of attack scenario modeling where red (offensive) and blue (defensive) teams unite to form a powerful purple force.

A real-life case will be our guide as we share battle-tested techniques to fortify your defenses. Real-life attack scenario Steal confidential data



The objective / flag

An attacker will try to steal the confidential data of your organization.

Determine objectives / flags

Determine

objectives / flags

Perceptual positions

- Orange Cyberdefense
- The customer = you

Develop potential

threat scenarios

Neutral observer

Select threat scenario(s)

Potential threat scenario

#2

#1

An attacker will look for (zero-day) vulnerabilities in an application and exploit those vulnerabilities.

The objective is to reach and gain control of the internal system located at the deepest level of the network and obtain confidential data (= crown jewels).

Perceptual positions

- Orange Cyberdefense
- Threat Intelligence
- Ethical hacker
- Criminal mindset = adversary, hacker
- The customer = you
- Neutral observer

Refine the threat scenario - (1) Attack scenario



Perceptual positions

- Orange Cyberdefense
 - Threat Intelligence
 - Ethical hacker
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An attacker will look for (zero-day) vulnerabilities in an application and exploit those vulnerabilities.

The objective is to reach and gain control of the internal system located at the deepest level of the network and obtain confidential data (= crown jewels).

Once the internal systems are reached, the attacker can try to trigger the following actions:

- 1. Execute code on one or more servers in the internal system.
- 2. Exfiltrate confidential information.

Selected threat groups

Threat groups who are active in the financial sector:

Attack group name	Associated groups
admin@338	
Andariel	Silent Chollima
<u>APT-C-36</u>	Blind Eagle
<u>APT18</u>	TG-0416, Dynamite Panda, Threat Group- 0416
<u>APT19</u>	Codoso, C0d0so0, Codoso Team, Sunshop Group
<u>APT38</u>	NICKEL GLADSTONE, BeagleBoyz, Bluenoroff, Stardust Chollima
<u>APT41</u>	WICKED PANDA
BlackTech	Palmerworm
Blue Mockinghird	

MITRE ATT&CK filters

Filters applied to the MITRE ATT&CK navigator.

Platforms:

- Linux
- Network
- PRE (Preparatory techniques)
- Containers
- SaaS

Data sources currently collected

- 1. Syslog of the Operating systems
- 2. Access logs of the Load balancers
- 3. Events of the Intrusion Detection System
- 4. Events of the Firewall

Refine the threat scenario - (2) Architectural system overview





Conceptual attack scenario



Crawl application	Components: A
Especiation at Local command Local printing mercelene and Colleging protocol CEC communication weakership control and control	
 Conceptual attack 	
Y Y	
	Components: B
• <u> </u>	
Cellection of data	
Laberal movement to other servers	Internal systems
Lateral movement to other servers	Induces ad agradients

High-level steps of the attack – scenario

Unified kill chain stage	Component A	Component B
Reconnaissance	TS1.1: Crawl application	TS1.9: Local subnet scanning
Weaponization		
Defense Evasion	TS1.3: Local command execution on application server	
Delivery		
Exploitation	TS1.2: Exploitation of web application vulnerability	TS1.10: Exploitation of remote service
Persistence	TS1.5 : Persistance on application server	TS1.12: Persistence on the remote server
Command & Control	TS1.6: Outgoing protocol probing TS1.7: C&C communication	TS1.13: C&C communication
Pivoting		
Privilege Escalation	TS1.4: Local privilege escalation	TS1.11: Local privilege escalation
Discovery		
Lateral Movement		TS1.14B: Lateral movement to other C-SOC core systems
Execution		
Credential Access		
Target Manipulation / Impact		
Collection		TS1.14A: Collection of data
Exfiltration		TS1.15: Exfiltration of data
Impact		



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Exfitration		TS1.15: Exfitration of data
Impact		

Scenario

attack tree



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zari agotzeton Componente A	ld	Action	MITRE AT	T&CK mapping	Stage	Description	Component
	TS1.9	Local subnet scanning	<u>T1046</u>	Network Service Discovery	Reconnaissance	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.	A: Application server
Comparison Comparison The Construction The Construction	TS1.10	The exploitation of a remote service	<u>T1210</u>	The exploitation of Remote Services	Exploitation	Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post- compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.	B: Database server
	TS1.11	Local privilege escalation	<u>T1068</u>	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Privilege Escalation	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.	B: Database server

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Implemented detection points

- Network security devices
- Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing
- Anti-Advanced Persistent Threats (AAPT)
- Endpoint detection and response (EDR) security technology
- Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems
- Flow collectors (network traffic analysis)
- Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI/TI)



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Implemented countermeasures

ld	Action	Stage	Mitigation					
TS1.1	Crawl portal pages	Reconnaissance	1					
TS1.2	The exploitation of a web application vulnerability	Exploitation	 Patching policies are limited only to zero days vulnerabilities. Misconfiguration is prevented by hardening. 					
TS1.3	Local command execution on the application server	Delivery	1					
TS1.4	Local privilege escalation	Privilege Escalation	 Patching policies are limited only to zero days vulnerabilities. Misconfiguration is prevented by hardening. Installation of the software is done by least privilege installation. Read-only system folders require extra effort to put new files. EDR built-in static Al and behavioural Al analysis prevent and detect attacks in real-time (ransomware, trojans, hacking tasla and behavioural and behavioural and behavioural attacks in real-time (ransomware, trojans, hacking tasla and behavioural attacks in the state attacks in the stat					
TS1.5	Persistence on the application server	Persistence	 Integrity checks are done to detect file modification. The file system is fully monitored 					
			(new, update, change of permission)					
			• Anomalies like reboot, malware execution monitored by the EDR.					
			 SIEM receives logs and alerts 					

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		T1005	T1021.004	T1041	T1046	T1048	T1053	T1068	T1071	T1074	T1102	T1104	T1136	T1190	T1210	T1505.003	T1543	T1560	T1567	T1570	T1573	T1589.001	T1590.003	T1592.002
DS0017	Command	•		•	•	•	•			•			•				•	•		•				
DS0029	Network Traffic		•	•	•	•			•		•	•		•	•	•				•	•			
<u>DS0015</u>	Application Log													•	•	•								
DS0027	Driver							•									•							
DS0022	File	•		•		•	•			•						•	•	•		•				
DS0009	Process	•	•				•						•			•	•	•		•				
DS0019	Service																•							
<u>DS0003</u>	Scheduled Job						•																	
DS0002	User account												•											
DS0023	Named pipe																			•				
<u>DS0033</u>	Network share																			•				
DS0012	Script																	•	•					
DS0028	Logon Session		•																					
DS0035	Internet scan																							•



Data source mapping

Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing Anti-Advanced Persistent Threats (AAPT) Endplimplemented detection points logy Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems Flow collectors (network traffic analysis) Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI/TI) Implemented Attack defense countertree measures Command Network Traffic Application Log Driver File Process Service Scheduled Job User account Named pipe Network share Script Logon Session Internet scan Data source mapping

Detection capability scoring

Ia	Action	Detection ca	pability	Stage
TS1.1	Crawl application	<u>T1592.002</u>	•	Reconnaissance
		<u>T1589.001</u>		
		<u>T1590.003</u>		
TS1.2	The exploitation of a web application vulnerability	<u>T1190</u>	•	Exploitation
TS1.3	Local command execution on the application server			Delivery
TS1.4	Local privilege escalation	<u>T1068</u>	•	Privilege Escalation
TS1.5	Persistence on the application server	<u>T1543</u>	•	Persistence
		<u>T1136</u>		
		<u>T1053</u>		
TS1.6	Outgoing protocol probing	<u>T1102</u>	?	Command &
		<u>T1104</u>		Control
		<u>T1573</u>		
TS1.7	C&C communication	<u>T1071</u>	•	Command &
		<u>T1571</u>		Control
		<u>T1572</u>		
		<u>T1102</u>		
TS1.8	Scanning tool transfer	<u>T1570</u>	•	Delivery
TS1.9	Local subnet scanning	<u>T1046</u>	Ø	Reconnaissance
TS1.10	The exploitation of a remote service	<u>T1210</u>	•	Exploitation
TS1.11	Local privilege escalation	<u>T1068</u>	•	Privilege Escalation
TS1.12	Persistence on the remote server	<u>T1505.003</u>	•	Persistence
TS1 13	C&C communication	T1071	Ø	Command &

Network security devices

It is uncertain whether this attack is detected

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Comprehending potential threats, attack vectors, risks, and their business impact is a critical factor that sets apart cybersecurity excellence from cybersecurity in the mainstream.



Thank you!

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Scenario attack tree

